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McLaughlin, J. and Clavering, E.K. (2012) Visualising Difference, Similarity and 
Belonging in Paediatric Genetics. Sociology of Health and Illness. 34(3): 459–474 
Abstract 
Paediatric genetics is increasingly playing a role in explorations of why a child may not be 
reaching developmental milestones, while experiencing various health concerns and 
displaying unusual physical characteristics. The diagnostic processes include close analyses 
of a child’s body in order to identify ‘clues’ to possible genetic variation. When the genetic 
variation identified is new and complex there is significant uncertainty about what 
relationship that variation has to childhood development and what it will mean for a child’s 
future. This paper, drawing from an ethnographic study of a genetics clinic, explores what 
versions of childhood difference and normality are produced by genetic explorations marked 
by uncertainty. The focus is on the significance of visual dynamics within the consultation, in 
family stories or photographs, and in the images found on websites which catalogue genetic 
syndromes. Our argument is that inside and outside the clinic the visual interpretations create 
understandings of the child that at times position them as other, while at other times recognise 
them as normal and ‘one of us’. The uncertainty embedded in identifying rare genetic 
variations enables multiple interpretations of the child to emerge which do not ‘fix’ them into 
the category of the ‘genetically other’. 
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Body of Text Word Count: 7954
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Visualising Difference, Similarity and Belonging in Paediatric Genetics 
 
Introduction 
Children can now be tested for a range of single gene disorders that have established 
pathways to diagnosis and treatment, for example Phenylketonuria, Achondroplasia and 
Cystic Fibrosis. However, paediatric genetics also explores less established associations 
between variations within (deletions) and across (translocations) chromosomes and problems 
in childhood development. Some of the associations have become established enough to be 
given a name, others are so unique they are only referred to via the pattern of chromosomal 
difference found (for example, ‘2q37 deletions’). Whether named or not, such associations, 
for now at least, are often unable to generate clarity in terms of both prognosis and treatment. 
In the future the range of associations that can be drawn between genetic variation and 
development differences is likely to grow. One reason for this is the increased use of DNA 
microarray analysis within both genetic research and clinical practice (Miller et al. 2010).  
For example, a number of international research projects are underway using microarray 
analysis to explore the role genetics may play in Autistic Spectrum Disorder (Pinto et al. 
2010; Shen et al. 2010).  
The history of medicine contains many diagnostic processes, which over time become 
routinised and associated with treatment avenues. It can be argued that even while the clinical 
benefit of new diagnostic approaches remains disputed, in the meantime what they can 
provide is social utility. What utility is provided by a diagnosis is contingent on the social, 
political, economic and cultural location of the child and their family: for example, the 
healthcare and social care system they are reliant on; the resources or capital they hold; and, 
the meanings they derive from medical diagnosis (Rapp and Ginsberg forthcoming). The 
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counterargument from within disability studies is that - whatever the social utility such 
diagnoses and research provide - they produce a growing medicalisation of human variation 
(Kerr and Shakespeare 2002). For example, an important concern is whether the position of 
the child within their family is undermined by focusing on what is different about them 
(Asche 2006; Finkler 2001). We may ask then, in a context where clinical utility is limited, 
what kinds of framings of childhood difference are produced within the processes of genetic 
diagnosis? Furthermore, who are the important actors producing such framings, and how do 
they establish potentially competing framings over and above others?  
This paper explores these questions via discussion of an ethnographic study of 
families accessing a genetics centre in the UK. The focus of the study is children who are 
referred to the centre because they have development problems and/or unusual physical 
characteristics which other medical investigations have been unable to explain. The 
diagnostic process begins with dysmorphology (the visual analysis of the child’s body aimed 
at identifying ‘abnormal’ features) and explorations of family history, before then moving on 
- over time in a process geneticists refer to as ‘watchful waiting’ -  to also involve various 
analyses of the child’s (and sometimes parents’) blood. The study is examining a range of 
interrelated issues, for example what the production or non-production of a genetic 
explanation means for families (McLaughlin and Goodley 2008); whether it makes a 
difference that a genetic syndrome is inherited or new; different understandings of social and 
biological inheritance; the production of moral tales of family boundaries of inclusion and 
exclusion; different practices of authority within the diagnostic process; and children’s own 
understandings of family and genetics (Clavering and McLaughlin 2010). What the different 
aspects share is a focus on the interplay of understandings of genetics, family, and childhood 
and the significance of such interplay for questions of identity and selfhood.  
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In this paper we focus on the understandings of childhood difference brought into 
social and medical significance through visual aspects of the diagnostic process. Within this 
we are looking at several things. First, the form of medical gaze produced in the examination 
of the child’s body; second, the interpretation of visual representations of the child and other 
children with similar patterns of genetic variation; and third, how representations and 
understandings of family and kinship influence the interpretation of the child’s body. Before 
examining these three aspects of the diagnostic process we provide some context to the paper, 
first by highlighting existing literature about the production of childhood otherness, and 
second, by describing our project. 
 
Childhood otherness 
When a young child is not reaching important developmental markers it ‘disrupts taken-for-
granted assumptions about the mind and body’ (Kelly 2005a: 181), raising questions for what 
future she or he may have. When this is combined with physical features which mean that a 
child looks different to others then the child can fall under a social gaze which frames them  
as ‘damaged’ (Lindemann Nelson 2001), ‘monstrous’ (Shildrick 2002), or ‘stranger’ (Hughes 
2002). Lindemann Nelson uses the notion of damage to signify the ways in which 
problematic social understandings of people who are thought of as different ‘damage’ the 
person by imposing an identity onto them. This imposed identity, for example presenting a 
child or adult who is disabled as someone who is tragic and to be pitied, creates 
misrecognition of who they are or can be, and limits the space they have to define for 
themselves who they are, can be or indeed want to be. In this context of social othering, one 
role medicine can play is to reduce the socially noticeable differences associated with a 
child’s disability (McLaughlin 2005; McLaughlin & Goodley 2008). For example, drugs to 
minimise the disruptive behaviour associated with ASD, or, surgery to minimise the 
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distinctive physical characteristics associated with Down’s syndrome or restricted growth 
(Hansen & Hansen 2006; Parens 2006). Part of the rationale behind parents’ actions can be 
understood as seeking to shield the child from the social costs of difference (Rehm & Bradley 
2005; Kittay 2006).  
 The danger however, from the perspective of disability studies (Molloy & Vasil 
2002), is that rather than being a solution to the problem of explaining childhood difference, 
medicine can become part of the problem (Blum 2007; Conrad & Potter 2000; Gillman et al. 
2000). Historically the association of disability with tragedy is a damaging discourse which 
medicine helped produce (Barnes and Mercer 2003). Once a child is provided with a medical 
category, even one sought with the goal of providing support and treatment, it becomes 
difficult to escape that category and for the child to be read independently of it (Kelly 2005b; 
Landsman 2003). In this way difference is produced and secured in the attempt to explain 
difference. In relation to paediatric genetics, Featherstone et al. query whether ‘the diagnosis 
of a genetic condition can place in hazard the identity of a child’ (2006: 101). Shaw et al. 
(2003) focus on dysmorphology’s link back to nineteenth century phrenology - the 
categorisation of population types via ‘unusual’ physical characteristics - in order to argue 
that this history creates an association with medicine’s complicity in the production of 
stigmatised, monstrous identities/populations (Paul 1998). 
However, it is important to pause and place paediatric genetics within its social and 
cultural context, in particular, to recognise the multiple ways in which categories of the 
‘acceptable person’ are produced (Carsten 2004; Fitzgerald 2008; Kittay 2006; Landsman 
2003; Raspberry & Skinner 2007). While medicine can be a factor in dynamics of 
stigmatisation and othering, this does not occur in a context-free vacuum. Of at least equal 
significance are the social and cultural notions of shame and exclusion which operate at the 
level of kinship and community (Gray 2002).  Kinship dynamics of difference and othering 
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are an important aspect to bring into the analysis of paediatric genetics, not least because the 
diagnostic process brings family history and therefore family narratives of belonging and 
difference into the foreground. Family is hugely significant in shaping the identity of 
children, within complex social and cultural productions of kinship connection and 
disconnection (Carsten 2004). Anthropological insight highlights the importance of rhetorics 
of shared biological connection – which can now be articulated as the shared substance of 
DNA – in social and cultural framings of legitimate kinship formations (Carsten 2004; 
Schneider 1968). Strathern argues that genetics has become a cultural tool in contemporary 
constructions of the substance of kinship, emphasizing ‘the naturalness of biological kinship’ 
(1992: 53). Children themselves are material and embodied versions of the substance of 
kinship relations. This is why when children come into a family through different routes, such 
as with the aid of reproductive technologies, or adoption, or through the remaking of family 
ties via step-families, families work to both position the child as one of them, and develop 
practices of family which provide their formation with social legitimacy (Haimes 2003). If a 
child is thought of as different and other, this can put in jeopardy well sculpted 
understandings of the social legitimacy of family ties. For example, questions can be raised 
about whether poor parenting has contributed to their child/ren’s problems; or whether the 
mother did something damaging such as smoke or drink during pregnancy. Therefore, a 
relationship exists between how a child who appears to be different is framed and the validity 
of kinship formation. 
What is required is an examination of how genetic investigations and representations 
and ongoing practices of kinship come together to frame the significance of differences in a 
child’s development and physical features.  
 
Methodology 
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This article is based on data emerging from ongoing fieldwork with 17 families of children 
newly referred to a genetic service in the UKi
The study is based in an area of England associated with significant socio-economic 
deprivation, and a predominately fairly stable white, working class population, with 
continued patterns of strong kinship ties. This background is reflected in the lives of the 
families - the majority (n14) defined themselves as working class, several (n7) were located 
in dispersed ex-mining villages or semi-rural locations across the region, while all families 
lived close to or had strong connections to extended kin. Our methodological approach 
follows each family over time (up to 18 months from first referral), going with them into the 
different settings of their lives and listening to the perspectives of multiple actors within the 
family, including parents, siblings, other significant family members and the children marked 
as different themselves. Fieldwork data is generated through a mix of qualitative longitudinal 
interviews and non-participant observation in clinical and non clinical encounters. 
Recruitment occurred through letters of invitation sent via the genetics service. We have put 
in place a number of measures, as part of the overall approach towards protecting the 
. The service is based within one hospital trust, 
but undertakes clinics across a large rural and urban region. Referrals, usually triggered by 
paediatricians looking after the child, lead to an initial consultation at one of the clinics. All 
first (and subsequent) consultations are led by a geneticist, although others, usually a 
paediatrician or a medical trainee, can sometimes be present. If the geneticist feels that there 
is little indication from the consultation that further genetic exploration could provide 
anything of value (usually framed as to the family), then things can end there. If, instead, the 
geneticist thinks there is something they can look for, then further consultations would occur 
to establish whether a particular syndrome or pattern of polygenetic variation can be found, 
and whether this could be explained via inheritance from one or both parents or a new 
mutation.  
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anonymity of the participants, to ensure that the clinic does not know which families go 
forward to be full participants. This includes carrying out observations in the clinics with 
families who have agreed to be ‘non-participants’, so that the clinic staff do not know which 
consultations, and therefore which families, are then included in the analysis and writing up 
of the data. The project obtained ethical approval via the Local Research Ethics Committee 
(LREC) of the NHS National Research Ethics Service (NRES). 
Analysis is based on transcripts of anonymous interviews and the detailed notes of 
observations. Via independent and then shared coding of transcripts and notes, a theoretically 
influenced coding frame was developed, which was then applied to the transcripts. 
Comparative analysis across the transcripts and notes via the coding frame, sat alongside 
continued engagement with the differing narratives emerging within the individual families 
(Riessman 1993).  The focus for this paper is on the completed analysis of the interviews and 
observations of all the families who have had their first consultation (the majority of which 
we observed). The patterns we discuss are those which were evident across the transcripts 
and observation notes, they are therefore exemplars of the trends in the data.  
 
The genetic consultation: Clues and photographs 
Almost all the first consultations we observed involved three key aspects: the close 
examination of the child’s body, taking photographs of that body, and questions around 
family history. The geneticists described this process to families as ‘looking for clues’. Much 
of the process of clue gathering centred on identifying unusual features in the child’s physical 
characteristics, mediated by ways in which they did or did not look like other family 
members: 
The geneticist, while washing hands, turns to the mother and asks: If you see pictures 
of his brother at the same age, do they look the same? 
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Mother: No they’re totally different, different hair, different features. His brother 
takes after me, while he takes after his dad. 
Geneticist: So, if we saw a picture of dad at the same age, would they look the same? 
Mother: Yes, the double of each other. 
Geneticist, still at sink, speaks to child (Jake): You’ve got a lovely smile! 
…. 
Geneticist comes down onto honkers, at eye-level with Jake, who puts his head 
down.…  
At this point the geneticist’s tone of voice is very soft, very slow and gentle, speaking 
to Jake: Can I see your hand too? Thank you very much.  
Still speaking in very gentle tone, the geneticist nods to the mother and asks: And you 
are seeing Dr [X], and you think his eyes are ok?  
While speaking, the focus of the geneticist’s gaze remains on Jake all the time. 
Mother: They’re fine, though he has got a lazy eye…. 
Geneticist stands back up: Can we just pop his top off? 
Once the mother removes child’s top, the geneticist asks Jake in very upbeat but still 
gentle tone: Can I just hold you for one minute? 
Geneticist then looks at the mother: It’s just to get a sense of his weight, and his 
body… You’re quite a floppy boy. 
(Observation notes, First Consultation. Keddy Family) 
 
The process of gathering clues places the child’s body under intense scrutiny. The focus of 
first consultations was not blood tests, or the interpretation of DNA microarray analysis, 
instead it was the embodied presence of the child. The features mark out the child because, 
while Jake may look like his father, the focus is on identifying what makes him look different 
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from others in the family and ways in which he feels physically different (‘floppy’). The 
examination of Jake’s physical distinctiveness is the proxy for what may be different about 
his internal genetic make up. As such the physical characteristics focused on (his hands, and 
muscle development) move from being visible but benign variation, to being a marker of 
potential genetic otherness. His internal genetic difference is marked on his body, a powerful 
symbolic reference point to what makes him different to others in both his family and the 
broader community. The use of distinctive physical characteristics in the diagnostic process 
can emphasise the peculiarity of those characteristics and dissects the child into an object of 
micro-medical scrutiny: 
Mother: She [the daughter] was a bit of meat on the bed. The geneticist was doing 
their job; I don’t have any resentment about that. But it just became, she became like 
an object. It was very, it just felt clinical and I didn’t like it. The geneticist was 
looking at bits of her.  
(Interview 1, Rushton Family)  
 
During the consultation, photographs are often taken to record the unusual physical features 
of the child, captured over time and compared to existing photographs of children said to 
have the same syndrome. In the process the camera becomes a vehicle for cataloguing 
difference. The kinds of photographs taken are very different from either the formal or 
informal photographs that a family would place on their wall, digital photo frame, or desktop 
screen saver. They are intimate in the way they dissect the child into close ups of the aspects 
of the body telling to diagnosis. Taking each photograph entails the consultant getting very 
close to the child with the camera, often on their knees on the floor of the consultation room, 
taking photographs of fingers, feet, nails, hands, ears, eyes and other features. While a 
professional photographer will use their skills and tricks of the trade (such as lighting) to 
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minimise ways in which a subject might look different or unusual, here the focus is on 
targeting the ‘strange’, or ‘abnormal’:  
Geneticist asks the child (Owen): Mind if I take a picture of you? … It’s for my 
friends in the clinic. 
The geneticist gets on to their knees in front of Owen, with digital camera ready. I 
[the researcher] can see the geneticist, but Owen has his back to me, sitting on his 
father’s knee.  
Father speaks to Owen: Don’t pull your face.  
Geneticist takes one photograph of the child – a shot straight on, of his face. The 
geneticist then holds the camera out, and asks Owen: Would you like to see yourself? 
The geneticist turns the camera round so Owen can see the picture that has been taken 
in the viewer.  
Geneticist: There you go. 
Then, looking at the image, the geneticist turns to the mother: They [Owen’s eyes] are 
a little wide but not anything to worry about. 
 (Observation notes, First Consultation, Morgan Family) 
The formal power to interpret the significance of the digital image shown to the child 
and parents remains with the geneticist. It is their medical authority which asserts that, while 
the eyes are a little far apart, there is nothing to worry about. It is their gaze which appears to 
hold the child within the scope of normal physical development or outside of it. Looking at 
the interaction as a whole we can also see ways in which the geneticist seeks to de-objectify 
and re-humanise the process by introducing practices we would more readily recognise as 
elements of taking a family photograph. One example of this is the suggestion that it is their 
‘friends’ who will see the photograph (as opposed to others in the genetics team who will be 
involved in discussions around diagnosing the child). However, this crossover into the 
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familiarity of a casual photograph is hard to maintain; the medical gaze comes back to 
authorise the interpretation of the photograph’s significance, even if the process draws from 
other social registers. As Latimer et al. (2006) argue regarding dysmorphology, the clinician 
is the skilled reader and interpreter of visual difference and similarity.  
 
Kinship images and stories of difference 
In the context of everyday family life, photographs play very different roles than those in the 
consultation. Both formal family portraits and informal photographs of holidays, birthdays 
and other symbolically significant occasions are important family practices, which place the 
camera at the centre of making kinship connections (Atkinson et al. 2001; Bouquet 2001). As 
Finch has argued, displays of family life, via photographs, paintings, memorabilia, are ‘the 
process by which individuals, and groups of individuals, convey to each other and to relevant 
audiences that certain of their actions do constitute “doing family things” and thereby 
confirm that these relationships are “family” relationships’ (2007: 67). Displays of family 
cannot be separated from the stories of relationships and boundaries that both the stories and 
images together sustain (Finch and Mason 2000; Ribbens McCarthy et al. 2000). A family 
story ‘reflects a family’s values, culture, and its collective meanings’ (Kellas 2005: 367). As 
well as showing who belongs, photographs and stories also operate to mark more subtle 
gradients of belonging, which provide testimony of tensions and disputes within family ties.  
In the following discussion of informal photographs and family histories drawn from 
one particular family, we can see the significance of existing kinship understandings of 
inheritance and health in the production of familial relations. These representations situate the 
child being seen by the genetics service as other within the family, regardless of what 
emerges from the genetics consultation. At the end of the first consultation the mother 
showed the consultant a mobile phone image of the sister of the child being examined:  
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The mother looks through her mobile phone for a photograph of her older daughter 
without glasses on. She says to the geneticist: You can see they’re [her two daughters] 
totally different.  
….. 
The father finds a picture of their older daughter looking straight ahead and hands 
phone to the geneticist, who looks at it, then holds it next to the child (Grace) who is 
being examined: Hm, well, I think you can see lots of similarities, you can tell they’re 
sisters, though their head shapes are obviously different…. 
Mother: The [older] sister takes after me, Grace takes after you [to father]. 
(Observation Notes, First Consultation, Brown/Jones Family) 
Significantly, it is the mother who focuses on highlighting how different the children look 
(‘they’re different’); while it is the geneticist who emphasises similarities the children share 
as sisters (‘lots of similarities’). In a subsequent interview with the maternal grandmother the 
same claim - that Grace ‘took after’ her father - was repeated: 
The only thing I can see is that Grace looks like her dad. She’s got my daughter’s 
small features, but other than that I don’t see anything. Now in my other 
granddaughter, certain mannerisms, she’s me mother, believe it or not, [laughs] I 
think oh, she’s me mother, born long after me mam died... But I can’t see anything at 
all in my granddaughter with learning problems, apart from that she looks like her dad 
and she’s got, but she’s got her mam’s tiny little features, that’s all I can say about 
her… ‘cos she is him, which takes us back to, well it must be his side.  
(Interview 1, Brown/Jones Family, Maternal Grandmother) 
The grandmother suggests one granddaughter belongs to the maternal line through 
claims to recognise shared characteristics, while she aligns the other granddaughter to the 
father’s side. In doing so the grandmother seeks to frame the sisters as belonging to different 
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and differently valued, heritages within the broader family. The final point by the 
grandmother directs us to connections being made by both grandmother and mother. The 
child, they believe, looks like her father: closer physical similarity, equates to closer genetic 
connection; closer genetic connection, equates to the source of her problems being him. In so 
doing she becomes an other to their family, she is the embodiment of the intrusion of 
difference via the father’s genetic material. 
For all the grandmother’s assertions about the source of the apparent genetic fault, 
when we did the first interview with her, the clinic had not established either what particular 
syndrome they could associate with the child’s problems, or its possible source. Indeed it 
could be either parent or neither. Whatever the outcome of the diagnostic process the referral 
to genetics is already providing a rhetorical device, which supports well established 
boundaries produced by her. ‘His’ family will always remain separate. The grandmother can 
legitimize a dislike for him, via a genetic rhetoric of poor stock. He has introduced a 
‘substance’ (Carsten 2001; Schneider 1968) into the kinship line, which is not welcomed. 
Therefore, the process of genetic investigation is not the producer of otherness here; instead it 
is well-established moral tales of kinship boundaries. 
 
Visualising similarity  
So far we have concentrated on processes – both within diagnostic exploration and kinship 
association – which emphasise the ways in which a child is different from others in the family 
and wider community. However, these same processes can also bring the child back into the 
fold of family and ‘human acceptability’ (Landsman 2003: 1950).  In this section we 
highlight two common occurrences within diagnostic encounters which reject difference in 
favour of similarity and belonging.  
As before, we begin with visual interpretations within the first consultations: 
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About half way through the consultation the geneticist examines the child (Connor) 
by looking at him as he stands in front of his mother just in his underpants. 
Geneticist: Actually there’s nothing about him to make me suspect an underlying 
genetic cause [to his height]. He looks very like you! 
Mother laughs.  
(Observation notes, First Consultation, Dougherty Family) 
In this consultation (and others) genetic difference is rejected by interpreting the child as 
displaying characteristics associated with his biological kin. Familial resemblance marks both 
the close bond the child shares with others and secures a sense of normality they also can 
share (Strathern 1992). Both geneticists and family members used recourse to familial 
similarity to reject that there was anything significantly different about how a child looked, 
and therefore their internal genetic makeup: 
Geneticist [to child (Emily)]: Sometimes it can be good to give extra growth hormone, 
even if the tests show you are making enough, it might still make a difference.  
---- 
Geneticist gets up to wash their hands, turns to father: How tall are you sir? 
Father: Five [foot] ten [inches] 
Geneticist: And Emily’s mum? 
Father: She isn’t very tall, and Emily’s sister isn’t very tall either. 
Geneticist sits back down and looks at the height chart again. Then looks at Emily, 
talks very softly: Do you mind if I look at your hands? It may seem like a funny thing, 
but I’m just looking for clues. 
(Observation notes, First Consultation, Nutall Family) 
This discussion came more than halfway through the consultation after earlier questions had 
focussed on the child’s height as a probable indicator of an underlying genetic syndrome. 
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However, the observation here pin points the moment when there was a shift in emphasis as 
the height of other family members is taken into account. Height then moves from being 
potentially problematic for the child, to being a possible trait that fits more closely within 
family normative patterns, something instead she shares with her sister and mother. Kinship 
is, therefore, reintroduced as a potentially less problematic connection to understand the child 
through.  
The second route through which geneticists refuted difference was to suggest that a 
child’s physical characteristics was within the realm of normal developmental variation: 
Geneticist [wheeling chair up closer to the child (Emily)]: It’s a chart that plots two 
lines – this one [points to one running along the top] shows the average height 
measurement for your age, and this line, with all these dots [hand-written, underneath 
the first line] is where you were at. So there are the two lines, and we can follow 
where the dots go along compared to the line of averages. Your line is not too far 
away from the average, but we can see times when your height slows down for a 
while. We can also look at your bone age, which is a bit more difficult to explain. 
This is when we do an x-ray to see if we can predict when you might stop growing. 
Some children stop growing at twelve or thirteen, others keep on growing until they 
are sixteen. If that’s the case for you, then you may catch up.  
All the time the geneticist talks directly to Emily. 
(Observation Notes, Consultation 1, Nuttall Family) 
Here the geneticist emphasizes the child’s every day normality (‘you may catch up’). While 
the focus of the geneticist’s gaze on the child’s body appears to problematise them, the verbal 
exchange - including the ways in which the child is spoken to directly - refutes objectification 
and instead asserts the diversity of child development. In interactions such as these geneticists 
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validate the human worth of a child whatever genetic variation she or he may or may not 
have: 
Maternal Grandmother: One thing I will say, just the, the last parting shot the 
geneticist who we saw, I thought it was a really nice thing to say, and very true. They 
said, ‘just take her home and enjoy her. She’s a little girl.’ Didn’t she? 
Mother: Yeah 
Maternal Grandmother: ‘Like any other mum… just forget about the syndrome, take 
her home and enjoy her for what she is.’   
(Interview 1, Smith/Henderson Family, Mother, Father, Maternal Grandmother)  
   
 The reasons given for rejecting difference in all the examples above are enabled via 
the uncertainty embedded in dysmorphology. The interpretative aspect of the examination 
and comparison to others (either other children with known genetic difference or a child’s 
existing kin) facilitates opportunities to identify characteristics which retain the child within 
the boundaries of normalcy. This creates a space for both geneticists and family members to 
look at the child in an expansive way, not confined by an authoritative and non-negotiable 
template. 
 
Virtual belonging 
In this final section before the conclusion we wish to bring in an aspect of the visual 
processes embedded in diagnosis which takes place outside the formal clinic environment: 
familial examination of dysmorphology images on the internet. The interpretation of these 
images are important because they provide an important reminder that the familial processes 
of making sense of genetic investigation draw on sources of information which families 
actively seek independently of what formal services provide (Gunderson, 2010; Schaffer et 
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al. 2008). A range of websites exist which catalogue the distinctive physical features 
associated with genetic syndromes and chromosomal variation. How families engage with 
these representations provides another space within which dynamics of connection and 
disconnection are made. 
All the families followed up consultations where particular syndromes or patterns of 
genetic variation were suggested with searches on the internet.  The original aim was often to 
find out further information, in particular what kind of future their child could expect. What 
quickly caught their attention were the images they found and how their child did or did not 
look like them. The Smith/Henderson Family discussed the range of images they found, 
stressing the feelings of unease and then reassurance they had experienced. The first sites  
found by the parents contained images of children older than their daughter (Sophie), but 
with a range of very marked physical abnormalities (alongside cognitive variation too). They 
had been clearly troubled by how physically different the children looked (they were 
particularly alarmed by pictures of children who looked like ‘dwarfs’). The potential 
inference that their child may look like that in the future, and therefore less like them, was 
deeply upsetting. Eventually the maternal grandmother found an alternative site, which 
offered an alternative future for the child which was not as marked by difference. On the site 
she found photographs of an older child, which also contained pictures of her at a similar age 
to her granddaughter. The grandmother quickly shared them with the mother and father:   
Father: There is also, when you look into it, some recent case histories with other 
people, sort of adults, where this is one, there’s one little girl, when they show you a 
picture of her when she was first born, and she is identical to Sophie. 
Maternal grandmother: That’s what I saw, I showed [mother], I says, I got quite a 
shock when I saw her. 
Father: and then you see a picture of her when she’s four and  
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Maternal grandmother: She’s beautiful isn’t she? 
Father: and it was completely different 
Mother: Yeah she’s lovely, she is a normal little girl, she’s just little. 
(Interview 1, Smith/Henderson Family, Mother, Father, Maternal Grandmother) 
 These pictures of an older child offered an alternative future for their daughter/grand-
daughter, which the family could positively imagine and incorporate into their version of 
family and connection. The internet site listed a range of possible traits (both physical and 
cognitive) associated with the syndrome. Because the child they saw looked most like the 
children who also appeared to develop less cognitive problems, the key message they took 
was that their daughter/granddaughter would also be less affected by such problems. Sophie 
was, therefore, both closer to their reading of ‘normal’ and, by implication, to being 
recognised as part of the family. 
The context within which the next family interpreted the images they saw on the 
internet provides an interesting insight to how - at least some - families may respond to the 
kinds of genetic information produced about chromosomal deletions and translocations made 
possible by DNA microarray analysis in the future. The Todd/Richardson Family were 
informed via telephone prior to a second consultation that the analysis of their son’s blood 
tests (in this instance using Fluorescence In Situ Hybridization [FISH], a forerunner to 
microarray analysis) appeared to show that he had a particular deletion on a numbered 
chromosome. Soon after the parents received this information, they were on the internet and 
found images of other children who had what they believed to be the same deletion. They 
were immediately struck by how similar their child looked to the other children, confirming 
for them that their child must have that deletion. When discussing this with the researcher 
before the consultation, the father said that when he looked at the images he thought he was 
looking at his own child. It was therefore a considerable surprise to be told in the consultation 
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that what the geneticists had found was a specific form of deletion pattern on the numbered 
chromosome which they would not have seen on the internet: 
Mother: we’ve been on the internet and seen lots of things, and some pictures. We can 
see a lot of Harry in them. 
… 
Geneticist starts to explain the chromosome results. 
… 
Geneticist [pointing to page]: You’ll see things named this on the internet, with 
Chromosome [N]. But what Harry has is Chromosome [N] point [N], which is 
different to what you mostly see on the internet.  
… 
What Harry has is [pointing to sections of his drawing of chromosomes] one copy of 
chromosome [N] which is completely normal, and one completely normal but with a 
tiny bit missing. This can cause a whole series of different things to happen. 
…. 
 We see about half a dozen kids a year with chromosome [N point N] deletion, and the 
one thing that is true is that they all vary a bit between them. This is difficult for you, 
as parents, because we can’t say exactly how things will be for each child. But it’s 
important to say it doesn’t change Harry. He is still Harry. So this is really just giving 
us an explanation about things going on for him. 
(Observation notes, Second consultation, Todd/Richardson Family) 
When the father reflected later he argued that it didn’t matter that his son’s deletion 
was different to those children whose images he had originally seen: 
 21 
Father: We could see how all these children look the same. Just having something 
different about your genes brings them all together, whatever the deletion-point-this-
that-or-the-other is. 
(Observation notes, Second consultation, Todd/Richardson Family) 
While the analysis of his son’s blood is able to produce a level of detail about the specific 
pattern of deletion, it carries little meaning or value for the father. As the consultant 
acknowledges it provides little additional knowledge about what the future holds. Instead 
what was meaningful for both the mother and father was seeing other children whose specific 
pattern of chromosomal variation may be different, but who look similar. The specific 
chromosome deletion does not in itself define the child – as different or similar. It is a piece 
of technical information, which says so little about the child now or in the future, that it 
cannot become a factor in framing him. Instead, what is capable of doing this are images of 
children who look similar found on the internet.   
 On the websites cataloguing dysmorphic features said to be associated with specific 
syndromes or chromosomal variation, children’s images are placed within a specific form of 
recognition and belonging. Being able to see that other children exist who carry a similar 
mark of genetic difference in their physical features can support processes of ‘watchful 
waiting’ parents undertake as they try to imagine futures for their children. Families find it 
troubling to see ‘grotesque’ versions of the characteristics associated with a syndrome. In 
contrast images of ‘normal looking’ children who they imagine to look like their child can 
produce feelings of comfort and security. The image - and therefore their child - remains 
within the category of the ‘acceptably human’ (Landsman 2003).  
 
Conclusion 
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The stories and images brought to the foreground during genetic investigation of a child with 
a possible rare and complex genetic variation have the potential to place that child in the 
category of the other, or reclaim them as valued members of kinship relations, and through 
this also as legitimate members of society. It is hard to deny the way in which the detailed 
examination of the child’s body within a consultation frames them as problematic. The 
authority of the medical gaze has the power to define a child’s features as problematic. 
However, that is different from saying the child themselves is positioned as problematic. For 
a variety of reasons this outcome is often escaped. First, the full dynamics of the consultation, 
via speech as well as bodily movement, include deliberate reminders of the child’s normalcy 
and the variation embedded in all children’s development. Second, there is a space within 
both dysmorphology and chromosomal analyses for those around the child to continue to see 
her or him as similar to them, as one of them. This space occurs through the ambiguity which 
lies at the heart of the visual interpretation of the child’s body. Craft expertise remains central 
to diagnosis and is a form of expertise which remains open to negotiation and fluidity of 
meaning. Uncertainty is also present when such analyses and interpretations move into the 
realm of future prognosis. Due to the rareness and complexity of the genetic variations being 
potentially identified, the geneticists struggle to say anything definitive about what the future 
holds. While parents find that uncertainty frustrating, it is the presence of uncertainty 
throughout the diagnostic process which allows them, and others, to exercise their own 
judgment based on their position within kinship worlds. It is the uncertainty contained within 
the diagnostic processes which enables all concerned to creatively engage with the child in 
such a way that escapes ‘fixing’ her or him into the category of the ‘genetically other’. 
What this discussion of our study has also shown is how framings of difference as 
other often already exist around the child prior to potential genetic explanations entering the 
picture. This is because the developmental problems the child has require explanation. This 
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requirement is in order to get support for the child, to help imagine the future and also, at 
times, to apportion or counter blame. Such demands for explanation emerge from within 
existing and culturally common familial stories of the past and present, within which family 
boundaries and senses of belonging are formed.  
The final aspect to note is the need to maintain the distinction between difference and 
other. A child can be thought of as developmentally different or genetically different and still 
be thought of as belonging to a family, to society. It is important to highlight the ways in 
which geneticists and family members are able to recognise the child as different and still 
‘one of us’. Genetic exploration does not close off the possibility that difference in either how 
the child looks or what they are capable of is understood as simply part of the spectrum of 
human variation and distinctiveness. Recognition of connection and value is not solely 
dependent on being seen as the same as others. But one word of caution, quite often in the 
acknowledgements by geneticists or by family members that a child was different, but still 
okay, was a focus on minimising that difference. The implication is that the other remains 
present within images of other children or futures in genetics websites, which parents do not 
want to imagine as possible scenarios for their child. The sense of relief that both geneticists 
and family members expressed when they interpreted a child as not belonging to those other 
children who were ‘grotesque’ implies that they would have struggled to incorporate 
significant difference in development and appearance into either their sense of humanness or 
of family. Of course we know such incorporation exists within families who love and cherish 
children who are significantly different. What the expressions of tangible relief witnessed in 
our study point to is that the - apparently - similar and normal child is easier to place within 
the boundaries of what it is to be human and what it is to be a kinship member.    
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1 To capture a retrospective perspective, the second stage of the fieldwork aims to do in-depth interviews with 
families (including parents, siblings, significant family and friends, and the children themselves) who have at 
least 5 years’ break from being last seen by the paediatric genetic service. 
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